

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
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O 132034Z DEC 77
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4021
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 12063

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PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: POLITICAL ADVISERS GROUP
MEETING, DECEMBER 13, 1977

CTB MESSAGE NO. 84

1. SUMMARY: AT DEC 13 MEETING OF POLITICAL ADVISERS GROUP, TENTATIVE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON GENERAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR JANUARY ROUND AND US AND SOVIET DELS EXPRESSED DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE MERITS OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION TO ASSIST IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MULTILATERAL ASPECTS OF THE CTB. END SUMMARY.

2. POLITICAL ADVISERS RETURNED TO CONSIDERATION OF QUESTION OF FUTURE WORKING ARRANGEMENTS, WHICH THEY BEGAN DURING DEC 9 MEETING. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS SUGGESTED A RELATIVELY ELABORATE STRUCTURE, ADVISERS AGREED ON A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH ENCOURAGED BY US DEL. UNDER THIS
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APPROACH, TWO WORKING GROUPS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED, ONE ON POLITICAL AND LEGAL MATTERS AND THE OTHER ON TECHNICAL MATTERS. THE POLITICAL/LEGAL WORKING GROUP WOULD, AS REQUIRED, MAKE USE OF SUBORDINATE GROUPS, INCLUDING A SUBGROUP FOR DEALING WITH THE PNE PROTOCOL AND RELATED ISSUES, AND ANOTHER FOR DEALING WITH OTHER POLITICAL/ LEGAL ISSUES. SIMILARLY THE TECHNICAL GROUP WOULD, AS

REQUIRED, SET UP SUBORDINATE BODIES, INCLUDING A SUBGROUP ON SEISMIC VERIFICATION AND ONE ON THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF ON-SITE INSPECTION TEAMS. BOTH WORKING GROUPS WOULD BE ABLE TO SET UP ADDITIONAL SUBORDINATE ARRANGEMENTS IF THEY SO DESIRED.

3. THE HEADS OF DELEGATION ARE EXPECTED TO ENDORSE THESE WORKING ARRANGEMENTS AT THEIR POST-PLenary MEETING SCHEDULED FOR DEC 14.

4. TURNING TO SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS, EDMONDS (UK ALT REP) SAID HE WAS INTERESTED IN LEARNING MORE ABOUT POSITIONS OF OTHER DELS ON QUESTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (ICC), WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN DEC 12 PLENARY.

5. TIMERBAEV (SOVIET ALT REP) EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT SOVIET GOVT COULD EVER AGREE TO SUCH A BODY. HE NOTED THAT NO CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE SEABEDS TREATY. WHILE SUCH A MECHANISM WAS SET UP FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TREATY, THE USSR HAD ONLY AGREED TO THIS RELUCTANTLY AND ONLY BECAUSE ENMOD TREATY DEALS WITH "NON-EXISTENT" ISSUES AND MECHANISM WOULD PROBABLY NEVER BE USED. CTB WAS A SERIOUS ISSUE, HOWEVER, AND ANY MECHANISM SET UP WOULD CERTAINLY BE USED.

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6. TIMERBAEV CONCEDED THAT, IF WE ADOPTED THE IDEA THAT GUIDELINES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN A TREATY ANNEX, WE MIGHT NEED SOME MECHANISM TO FOLLOW UP AND WORK OUT THE OPERATIONAL DETAILS. HOWEVER, BROADENING THE FUNCTIONS OF SUCH A BODY, AS SUGGESTED IN THE US WORKING PAPER, COULD CREATE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN THE FUTURE. HE NOTED THE US VIEW THAT AN ICC WOULD SERVE AS A "SAFETY VALVE" WHERE NON-NUCLEAR STATES COULD FEEL THEY WERE PLAYING A MEANINGFUL ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING THE TREATY. THIS IDEA SOUNDED ATTRACTIVE ON THE SURFACE, ESPECIALLY IF THE BODY WOULD OPERATE BY CONSENSUS. HOWEVER, DESPITE THE PREFERENCE FOR CONSENSUS AMONG OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS, OTHERS MIGHT WANT TO HAVE VOTING. HE THOUGHT THAT, BY PROPOSING AN ICC, WE WOULD BE OPENING THE DOOR TO PROPOSALS THAT WOULD BE "QUITE UNACCEPTABLE TO ALL OF US HERE."

7. TIMERBAEV CONCLUDED THAT, FROM THE START, PERHAPS WE SHOULD TAKE THE POSITION THAT NO MECHANISM IS NEEDED EXCEPT THREE INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTERS WHICH WOULD BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE. THIS WAS NOT HIS DELEGATION'S FINAL CONCLUSION, BUT HE

WANTED TO POINT OUT THAT THE QUESTION WAS A CONCERN TO THEM.

8. NEIDLE (US ALT REP) MAINTAINED THAT OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE WAS A MULTILATERAL TREATY THAT COULD ATTRACT ALL THE NON-NUCLEAR STATES THAT COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO JOIN. WE NEED TO DEVISE A VERIFICATION SYSTEM THAT WOULD ELICIT THE SUPPORT OF A LARGE NUMBER OF STATES, MANY OF WHICH WILL WANT TO FEEL THEY ARE PLAYING SOME ROLE IN THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY. HE NOTED THAT, IN THE PAST,

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A NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL NON-NUCLEAR STATES HAD BEEN VERY SENSITIVE TO THE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM ISSUE, CITING SWEDEN'S REFUSAL FOR SEVERAL YEARS TO SIGN THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A MECHANISM. NEIDLE SAID THAT, FROM OUR STANDPOINT, IT WAS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE ICC WAS NEEDED TO FULFILL ANY VITAL VERIFICATION FUNCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE ICC WOULD BE USEFUL IN GAINING BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY, AND THE FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURES WE HAVE SPELLED OUT IN THE WORKING PAPER ARE DESIGNED TO FULLY PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS.

9. NEIDLE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THE US PROPOSAL REGARDING A SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. THIS SEPARATE TRACK WOULD ENABLE US TO WORK OUT PROBLEMS OF REAL CONCERN TO US, AND WE WOULD INSIST THAT IT HAVE PRIORITY OVER THE MULTILATERAL TRACK. IT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ICC TO INTERFERE WITH THE SUCCESSFUL FUNCTIONING OF THE SECOND TRACK. UNDER THE LIMITED MANDATE WE HAD SUGGESTED FOR THE ICC, WE BELIEVE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR

SUCH INTERFERENCE WOULD BE MINIMAL. AS FAR AS THE
ATTITUDES OF THE NON-NUCLEAR STATES WAS CONCERNED, HE FELT
THEY WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT A CTB WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED IF
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THE MAJOR POWERS ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE TERMS OF THE
TREATY. GIVEN THIS RECOGNITION, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO
NEGOTIATE ACCEPTABLE PROVISIONS REGARDING THE ICC.
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